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consequence of the ability to sell songs through downloads is a new, and yet unnoticed, way to infringe copyrights, which, unless remedied, could lead to new classes of defendants never contemplated in the 1976 Act's protections for artists, musicians, and authors. Unlike a brick-and-mortar transaction, the act of purchasing a song on the web requires that the purchaser "download" a digital file of the song-that is, make a copy of the song that is located on the vendor's website and transfer that copy to the consumer's computer. Thus, downloading copies and phonorecords triggers copyright protections every time a consumer purchases and downloads a song from an online music retailer. 21 The consumer benefits at the expense of one of the rights of the copyright owner-the reproduction right. 22 Of course, by making one's song available for download, the copyright owner allows for such a reproduction.
But suppose the downloaded song is later the subject of an infringement suit regarding the melody or lyrics in the underlying musical composition. 23 Every time the alleged infringer's musical composition-which is fixed in the digital file of the sound recording-is downloaded, the purchaser of the downloaded file has made an unauthorized reproduction of an unauthorized adaptation of the plaintiff's musical work. To borrow from the Harrisongs example, George Harrison's "My Sweet Lord" constituted an unauthorized adaptation of the Chiffons' "He's So Fine." 24 Thus, a consumer's download of "My Sweet Lord" would be an unauthorized reproduction of an unauthorized adaptation of "He's So Fine."
While the Chiffons and Harrison resolved their litigation decades ago-leaving purchasers of "My Sweet Lord" safe from liability-rapper Biz Markie faced an infringement suit in the 1990s 25 and rapper 50 Cent was recently sued for allegedly taking another artist's instrumental. ) ("A copier will be liable for copying the musical work in its entirety, that is, the composition's words and music together, as well as for copying just the music or the words alone." (citing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.8 (2d ed. 1996))).
24. 
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This may expose online purchasers of both rappers' works to infringement liability. 27 In 1991, Biz Markie was found to have infringed Gilbert O'Sullivan's musical composition, "Alone Again (Naturally)." 28 Markie admitted to sampling a portion of O'Sullivan's work for use in his song "Alone Again."
29 O'Sullivan ultimately enjoined Markie's use of the sampling. 30 The district court rejected the defendants' argument that the pervasiveness of music sampling in the rap industry should excuse the infringement. 31 In the case of 50 Cent, 32 his song "I Get Money" is currently the subject of dispute in litigation with Caliber, another rap artist. 33 Caliber claims that the instrumental in 50 Cent's song infringes Caliber's copyright ownership of the track. 34 "I Get Money" went double platinum, 35 selling over two million copies as either a single or as a track on the album Curtis.
36
Even if only half of those purchases were downloads, that translates to one million consumers infringing Caliber's reproduction right. The combined statutory damages that Caliber could CONTENT FROM YAHOO! (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/6162288/50_ cent_sued_for_copyright_infringement.html?cat=33.
27. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion. 28. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185. 29. Id. at 183 ("Defendants admit 'that the Biz Markie album "I Need A Haircut" embodies the rap recording "Alone Again" which uses three words from "Alone Again (Naturally)" composed by Gilbert O'Sullivan and a portion of the music taken from the O'Sullivan recording.'"). For an explanation of sampling see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 886 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that " [s] ampling, common in rap, hip-hop, and urban music, typically involves making a digital copy from a master sound recording and using a piece in the making of a new work"). For a detailed discussion of the legal issues involved in sampling, see 37 It may only be a matter of time before the copyright holders of musical compositions sue consumers over downloads of songs that are the subject of infringement suits.
Through the Internet, copyright infringement has taken on new dimensions never foreseen by the legislators who enacted the 1976 Act. In an effort to address this overlooked area of potential liability, this Article urges legislative action. Rather than waiting for the courts to find a downstream defendant liable under such circumstances, 38 Congress should shield innocent consumers from liability for statutory damages for purchasing copies of songs they thought they were legally allowed to own.
This Article approaches this dilemma by first describing the state of "traditional" copyright infringement in the brick-and-mortar world in Part II. Part III details how copyright infringement on the Internet diverges from the traditional mode based on the difference in how the work is fixed and purchased. It also illustrates how downstream infringement by the consumer occurs through the downloading of an infringing song from a legitimate music retailer-an act that is several steps removed from the original infringement by the defendantmusician. 39 This section then discusses the effects of these internet 37 . See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The Statutory Damages provision of the 1976 Act states that:
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. Id. Engaging in some simple math shows that if one million music lovers downloaded an infringing song, such as "I Get Money," then the plaintiff-in this instance, Caliber-could receive anywhere between $750 million and $30 billion if he was able to collect from every person who infringed. There is, however, some relief for the "innocent" infringer:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Id. § 504(c)(2). If every consumer defended herself in court and met this burden, Caliber would collect a minimum of $200 million. See infra Parts III and IV for further discussion on innocent infringers and a proposed modification of this section of the statute.
38. Alternatively, courts could find that consumers are not subject to liability-even though copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability-under the 1976 Act. See infra Part III.
39. If one considers the original act of infringement to be the creation of the unauthorized derivative work by the defendant composer or musician, then the sound recording of that infringing work would be one step removed; distributing the sound recording to online music retailers would be two steps removed from the original infringing activity. The distribution by the online retailer would be three steps away, and, finally, the purchase and download by the consumer would be four steps
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DOWNSTREAM COPYRIGHT INFRINGERS 7 purchases on a class of third-party infringers: those musician-defendants who create infringing works and provide sound recordings for download. Part IV addresses public policy that supports reducing the liability of downstream copyright infringers and foretells some ramifications of allowing these suits to proceed. Part V then proposes solutions to shield consumers from downstream-infringement liability. This Article concludes with final thoughts on the necessity of ensuring that consumers are not caught in the legitimate web of composers protecting their musical compositions, and how allowing infringement actions against unforeseen downstream defendants can affect overall fidelity to the rule of law.
II. BUYING THAT INFRINGING CD AT THE SWAP MEET
In order to frame the discussion on why consumers who are downstream from the infringing activity should not be held liable for the actions of upstream infringing musicians, some historical context proves useful. Prior to the advent of music downloading from the Internet, one could only obtain an authorized phonorecord of a sound recording by visiting a brick-and-mortar store or other retailer 40 and purchasing the material object-such as a vinyl record, cassette, eight-track tape, or CD-in which the sound recording was "fixed." Through this world view, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976. This section, therefore, first explores the liabilities faced by a consumer who legally purchases a material object that embodies an infringing musical composition.
A. Civil Liability Under the Copyright Act
Going to a store and purchasing a CD containing either an authorized or unauthorized phonorecord does not involve any of the enumerated rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act. 41 The consumer has not copied the musical composition or sound recording and fixed that copy in a tangible medium of expression. She has not distributed a material object containing the copyrighted work, and she has not made an adaptation of downstream from the original infringing act.
40. As a young woman, I also frequently purchased music at "swap meets," flea markets, and garage sales. While some of these venues probably sold pirated music, most also sold a large quantity of new and used authorized phonorecords.
41. or publicly broadcast the songs contained on the CD. Even if the seller of the CD infringes one of these rights, the purchaser does not. Thus, in the brick-and-mortar world, consumers do not infringe a copyright owner's rights when they purchase a material object, even if it embodies an unauthorized copy or phonorecord.
42
A brick-and-mortar sale of the infringing 50 Cent CD infringes the distribution rights of Caliber and subjects the retailer to strict liability. 43 And the musician who wrote and recorded the infringing song may also incur liability for (1) vicarious or (2) contributory infringement based on the actions of the retailer.
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant "has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." 44 No knowledge of the infringing activity is required.
45
The musician who has recorded an infringing song and distributes it-either directly or through a record label-has both actual control over the sale of those phonorecords and a definite financial interest in their sale.
To be held liable for contributory infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) that a defendant has "knowledge of the infringing activity"; and (2) that the defendant "induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." 46 Again, in addition to facing direct liability, the musician who wrote and recorded the 43. See id. § 106(3) (giving the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to authorize distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale). Suits of this nature are not unprecedented; in the 1980s, several small music retail stores were sued for distributing unauthorized copies of CDs. 56 The Court elaborated on the difference between theft or conversion of a physical object and infringement of a copyright:
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While one may colloquially liken infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. 
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(A) for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(B) by the reproduction or distribution . . . of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.
59
Other provisions in the federal criminal code similarly punish traffickers and those who make unauthorized fixations or distributions, but not those who receive the goods.
III. MUSIC IN THE INTERNET ERA
The 1998 launch of the website Ritmoteca.com revolutionized the acquisition of sound recordings by consumers.
61
No longer were consumers limited to the selection at the local record shop; the universe of available genres became almost infinite. Online music stores have made it easier for consumers to purchase music from both well-known and obscure artists; new and unknown bands now have the ability to find an audience for their music.
In a brick-and-mortar transaction, a consumer does not make a copy when she buys a song; rather, she purchases a material object which embodies a phonorecord of the copyrighted work. Internet stores such as iTunes, CD Universe, and Amazon.com work differently-they sell songs via downloads. "A download is a transmission of an electronic file containing a digital copy of a musical work 62 that is sent from an on-line server to a local hard drive." 63 Under the Copyright Act, this downloaded electronic file is considered a material object.
64
"The Copyright Act . . . does not use materiality in its most obvious sense-to mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it refers to materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be 'fixed.'" 65 Thus, any object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a "material object." That includes . . . electronic files . . . . [For example, w]hen a user on a peer-to-peer network downloads a song from another user, he receives into his computer a digital sequence representing the sound recording. That sequence is magnetically encoded on a segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on other media.) With the right hardware and software, the downloader can use the magnetic sequence to reproduce the sound recording. The electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a "phonorecord" within the meaning of the [1976 Act]. 65. Id. at 171 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). The Copyright Act provides that "'[a] work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.'" 17 U.S.C. § 101. "The sole purpose of the term 'material object' is to provide a reference point for the terms 'phonorecords' and 'fixed. ' Purchasing a song online requires an authorized copying of that song from the music store's website or server onto the customer's computer. 68 A consumer could reasonably assume that the songs on the legitimate online music store available for purchase are there with the permission of the copyright owners and that any copying done in conjunction with the transaction is an authorized reproduction-that is, upon payment, the consumer has the permission of the copyright owner to create and download a copy.
69

A. Consumers as Downstream Infringers
Suppose, however, the purchased song is infringing on another musical composition. Since copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability, "a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in order to prevail . . . . Even an innocent copier-for example, one who copies in the belief that the infringed work is in the public domain or without realizing that he or she is copying-is liable . . . . 69. Even without express permission, the downloading could be interpreted to be a § 117(a)(1) exception. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner.").
70 71 Thus, under this strict liability standard, even these "innocent" downstream infringersthat is, those who are unaware that they are downloading an unauthorized copy of a song-are liable for infringement. One might think that the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) would not pursue these claims. They are not, however, above suing twelve-year-old girls 72 or the deceased. 73 For "innocent" infringers who can prove a good-faith belief that they were not infringing, there is a reduction in statutory damages:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. 74 This relief, however, was not designed to limit the damages to downstream consumer infringers-rather, it was designed to help publishers and broadcasters who printed, distributed, or publicly performed a work under the mistaken assumption that they had permission to do so. 75 The legislative history shows that Congress recognized infringement liability's potential to stifle the public's access to creative works. 76 The "innocent infringer" provision of section 504(c)(2) has been the subject of extensive discussion. The exception, which would allow reduction of minimum statutory damages to $100[, which has since been raised to $200,] where the infringer "was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright," is sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement, and it offers adequate insulation to users, such as broadcasters and newspaper publishers, who are particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit. On the other hand, by establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect; and it would not allow a defendant to escape simply because the plaintiff failed to disprove his claim of innocence.
Id.
76. Id.
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broadcasters to take chances on new works by withholding any undue punishment from the 1976 Act. Downstream infringement of this nature casts a wide net. Millions of customers could incur liability because they purchased and downloaded a song whose musical composition infringed on another's work. For example, suppose Caliber wins his infringement lawsuit against 50 Cent. Caliber would then have claims against both retail outlets-brick-and-mortar and online-for unauthorized distribution of an unauthorized adaptation of Caliber's song 77 and every consumer who purchased a download of the song through the online retailers for unauthorized reproduction.
78
Individually suing every consumer who downloaded "I Get Money" would be onerous; the song sold over two million copies. 79 With such a multitude of defendants for a single song, a copyright owner such as Caliber might seek to certify all of the purchasers of an infringing song as a defendant class. If Caliber were to file a suit against a class of defendants, a court may, in fact, certify the class. 85 First, the class could have over one million members; therefore, joinder of all members would be impracticable. Second, the questions of law or fact are common to all the members of the class-all class members downloaded a song from a music retailer's website. Third, the questions of law or factinfringement based on downloading an infringing song-are common to the class, as are the claims or defenses of the representative parties. The prong that creates the most difficulty for Caliber is the requirement that those individuals whom he chooses to be "the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. also have to contend with the notice requirements; 87 this may be achieved, however, by subpoenaing the online music retailer's records, which should contain the names and addresses of customers who purchased the song.
The class members who do not opt out would be represented by the class counsel, 88 who would likely claim "innocent infringement," which, if successful, could reduce statutory damages from $750 per defendant to $200 each. 89 It is unlikely that a single defendant would hire an attorney to have her damages reduced by $550; therefore, class certification may be in the best interest of the defendants in terms of reducing their monetary liability.
90
Should Caliber succeed in his class action suit, he would need to collect the statutory damages from all of the members of defendant class. Caliber has already acquired the names and addresses of all those persons who purchased and downloaded the infringing song for the purposes of serving notice. After a court enters judgment in favor of Caliber, he could probably seek a court order directing the online retailer to charge the statutory damages to the defendant class members' credit cards. It is unclear whether this would be successful.
Large record producers may be hesitant to alienate their customers by filing infringement actions against them. But an individual musician could see such an action as his "meal ticket." The musician may never have a hit song himself, but could "hit the lottery" by suing the one million customers who downloaded a hit song that had infringed his copyright.
B. Musicians as Inducers?
A musician who has created an infringing musical work and made a sound recording of that work available for download might also face third-party-infringement liability through the doctrines of vicarious Of course, a direct infringement must precede an indirect infringement-in the situation at hand, this is the consumer who downloads the infringing song. In our example, 50 Cent may not only have direct-infringement liability, but the distribution by the online retailers and downloading of his song by customers-both of whom are direct infringers-may subject him to third-party liability.
To 93 50 Cent would know about the infringing activity-downloading the songsbecause he is aware that the songs are available for sale online. After all, he-or his agents-negotiated with the online retailer for the song's presence on the website for sale and download. By this same reasoning, 50 Cent would also have materially contributed to the consumers' infringing conduct. In fact, it was his purpose to have the song purchased by the general public, even if he did not consider such purchases to be infringing activities. On the other hand, Caliber would face some difficulty proving that 50 Cent induced customers to infringe Caliber's copyright, no different from his attempts to show that 50 Cent induced a brick-and-mortar record store to infringe. 94 Just like a brick-and-mortar store, an online music retailer, such as iTunes or Amazon.com, would face infringement liability as the 91 distributors of an infringing musical work. 95 One could argue that the sale by the online music retailer and the purchase and download by the consumer is one act of infringement; however, these could also be considered two separate acts of infringement. The 1976 Act provides:
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally . . . . 96 Therefore, if the act of purchasing and downloading the song from an online music retailer comprises a single infringement, then the consumer and the retailer would incur joint and several liability; the plaintiff musician would not be able to collect from both defendants. 97 If, however, the distribution by the online music retailer and the copying by the customer constitute two separate acts of infringement, then the plaintiff musician could collect separately from each defendant.
Unlike a brick-and-mortar store, however, an online music retailer may seek protection under the safe-harbor provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which would provide immunity First, an online music retailer would have to qualify as a "service provider"
99 by showing it is "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor." 100 The online music retailer likely falls under the category of "a provider of online services," thus meeting the definition.
Section 512(c) provides the most plausible safe harbor for an online music retailer, limiting liability for service providers with "[i]nformation residing on systems or networks at direction of users."
101 Per subsection (c)(1), "[a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider" if certain conditions are met. The service provider-in this instance, the online music retailer-cannot "have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing."
102 One must first identify the "infringing activity"-options include the unauthorized adaptation of a musical composition or the unauthorized distribution of the unauthorized adaptation of the musical composition. Obviously, an online music retailer would argue that it is the former, and a plaintiff would argue that it is the latter.
103
The online music retailer and the musician likely agreed, however, that the retailer would store the digital file of the sound recording on its server, enable customers to purchase copies of the digital file for downloading, and receive a percentage of the sales. The website is not merely an enabler or a repository of files. Additionally, it voluntarily enters into agreements with musicians whereby it will distribute phonorecords of sound recordings; thus, it infringes the 103. If the infringing activity is determined to be merely the unauthorized adaptation, then the online music retailer is not a direct infringer and is eligible for the safe harbor. If, however, the infringing activity is the unauthorized distribution, then the online music retailer is a direct infringer and thus ineligible for the safe harbor.
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copyright. Finally, the music retailer selects the material appearing on its website.
104
The safe-harbor provision further requires that the provider of online services "d[id] not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider ha[d] the right and ability to control such activity." 105 An online music retailer would fail this requirement as well. The retailer profits off the download and has the ability to control the infringing activity-that is, the retailer has the ability to remove the infringing song file from its website and not make it available for download. 106 Therefore, the fact that an online music store actively chooses the material it sells and reaps a direct financial benefit from the sale of the MP3 files may remove any hope of a safe harbor. It incurs the same liability a brick-and-mortar store incurs; indeed, Apple has already faced lawsuits for this form of infringement. 107 As for a musician's vicarious liability due to the actions of the online music store, it is also the same as it would be in the brick-and-mortar situation discussed previously.
IV. HOW FAR DOWNSTREAM DO WE LOOK FOR INFRINGERS?
Public policy discourages liability for downstream infringement. In several instances, Congress has specifically created statutory exemptions for infringing uses by end-users of patented technology. For example, if a medical practitioner performs a medical activity-such as a patented surgical technique-that constitutes an infringement under the Patent Act, neither the "infringing" medical practitioner nor the hospital or facility that accommodated the surgery will face the provisions imposing the remedies, injunctions, damages, and attorney's fees. In the case of the downstream consumer who is unaware of the original copyright infringement by the defendant-musician, copyright law could embrace patent-law doctrines regarding end-user immunity and lack of notice.
112
Just like the ignorant downstream user of infringing patented technology, the purchasers of infringing songs could be considered too far removed to be foreseeable defendants.
113
One must also question whether the mode of purchase should affect a consumer's liability for copyright infringement. As noted earlier, purchasing a physical embodiment-such as a CD or vinyl record-does not impose copyright-infringement liability on the consumer.
114
To declare that this same activity-changed only by how the copyrighted work is fixed-now results in infringement seems grossly unjust. Instead, "fundamental notions of fairness and legal process" 115 should dictate that the same rules apply to both brick-and-mortar transactions and online purchases of music.
This unforeseen downstream-infringement liability could have serious ramifications-pursuing consumers who believe they are legally acquiring copies of songs could lead to unintended consequences regarding the downloading and purchasing habits of the public. It could 111. Id. 112. When faced with similar circumstances, policies and concepts from one area of intellectualproperty law are often adopted by another. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984) (borrowing the express language in the Patent Act regarding third party liability to similarly impose "liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity," namely vicarious liability and contributory infringement).
113. Similarly, in negligence law, Mrs. Palsgraf was unable to obtain any relief after being injured on a train platform by an exploding package because she was an unforeseeable victim too far removed from the act of negligence to receive relief in the courts. Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 346-47 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). For a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, "[t]he damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former." Id. at 351 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
114. 
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push people toward illegal download sites-after all, why do the right thing and pay for a legal download if one can still be sued? A consumer may think that if he could be held liable for infringement because of the conduct of a musician, he might as well just download songs for free in an unauthorized transaction and make it more difficult to get caught. After all, a transaction on iTunes is easier to trace-the website has the customer's name, address, and credit card information. For the illegal download, a plaintiff may face a more difficult-if not impossible-task of tracking down those individuals who use infringing peer-to-peer downloading software.
116
"More than one computer may be placed under a single [Internet Protocol (IP) address]. Thus, it is possible that the [Internet Service Provider (ISP)] may not be able to identify with any specificity which of numerous users" who are attached to a specific IP address at the time of the unauthorized download is the one who allegedly infringed.
117
Under such circumstances, providing the plaintiffs with "a long list of possible infringers would" impermissibly lead to a "fishing expedition." 
A. Is This Something the Courts Can Resolve?
Courts faced with consumer-infringement litigation may wish to borrow the downstream-infringement doctrine from patent law and, in this manner, limit consumer liability. 119 It may be considered legislating from the bench for courts to decide that this is a non-infringing use and hold that the rights granted to copyright owners under the 1976 Act do not include this kind of downstream activity; indeed, the First Circuit has held that there was no such exception in the 1976 Act. 120 The court noted that while Congress made express exceptions to infringement liability for solely personal and non-commercial use in the 1976 Act, it had not done so for music downloading.
121
As a second option, customers in a copyright-infringement action could rely on jury nullification 122 and hope that juries simply refuse to impose liability for infringement under these circumstances. It would be very risky, however, to rely on a jury's taking such action.
Third, a consumer who incurs infringement liability for downloading songs that she reasonably believed to be non-infringing may convince a judge that statutory damages violate constitutional due process or common law excessiveness.
The constitutional issue regarding excessiveness is unresolved.
Recently, in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the First Circuit reversed a lower court's finding that a jury's imposition of $675,000 in statutory damages for the downloading of thirty songs violated the defendant's constitutional right against a jury award as "'grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.'" 123 The appellate court found that the constitutional 126 and remanded to the lower court "for consideration of defendant's motion for common law remittitur based on excessiveness." 127 In our example, if a court upholds a judgment of damages against the defendant class, or Caliber accepts a remittitur, he would then have the task of collecting damages from the one million defendants.
128
B. Or Does This Require a Legislative Solution?
Courts have repeatedly stated that despite a law's harsh and unintended consequence, judges should refrain from legislating from the bench.
129
Thus, beyond the reduced statutory damages provided for when "innocent infringement" has been proven to the satisfaction of the court, action by Congress may be the prudent way to provide protection for downstream consumers caught in this web.
Any amendment to the 1976 Act that protects consumers in this manner should be carefully worded so as to only cover downloads of music for which there is a reasonable belief that the musical composition in the sound recording fixed in the phonorecord does not infringe on any other musical composition. Three alternatives could achieve this. The first creates an exemption to infringement; the second and third amend § 504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act regarding statutory damages. One alternative to the § 504 amendment gives the courts discretion to reduce damages and secondary transmissions. 132 One could analogize the creation of a bright-line exception for consumer downloads to the exception end receivers of a program received through a secondary transmission under § 111 of the 1976 Act-when watching a favorite television show, one assumes that the transmission was lawfully obtained by the cable or satellite company from the broadcaster. In the situation outlined in this Article, the consumer has a good-faith belief that the download purchased from the online music store is an authorized phonorecord of the sound recording and underlying musical composition. In the alternative, rather than completely exempting downstream consumers from liability, Congress could set the statutory damages for this situation to a nominal amount.
Providing an exception to infringement for consumers would create a bright-line rule for removing this unintended form of infringement. "In deciding whether to adopt a bright-line rule or a loose standard, the Supreme Court has considered who will need to apply the legal rule, and in what context." 133 The Fifth Circuit has noted that:
[ A bright-line rule "has the virtue of predictability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that are said to be 'unjust' or 'unfair.'" 135 As a disadvantage, bright-line rules can lead to "seemingly perverse results."
136 For example, consumers caught up in the web of the two musicians involved in an infringement suit over a copyrighted song currently fall on the infringement side of a bright line, which turns them into unintended downstream infringers-this can be viewed as a perverse result of this bright line of strict liability.
137 Another bright-line rule excepting this behavior from infringement liability may be the appropriate remedy.
Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Provide for Greater Judicial Discretion
This second option amends the provision regarding statutory damages-specifically § 504(c)(2) 138 -to provide greater judicial discretion regarding remedies.
Congress could enact legislation providing for one of several alternatives. Courts could (1) receive authority to absolve the defendant of any monetary liability; (2) retain the discretion to limit damages to a nominal amount; or (3) require only that the innocent infringer delete all copies of the infringing song file. Such discretion would provide consumers with some sense of relief and certainty that, should they face infringement claims, the court may reduce or eliminate any liability for monetary damages. 138. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) ("In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200."). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
One must bear in mind, however, that "as is always the case when an issue is committed to judicial discretion, the judge's decision must be supported by a circumstance that has relevance to the issue at hand." 139 Justice Ginsberg has "observed that 'unlimited jury [or judicial] discretion . . . may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities.'" 140 Thus, the downside to legislating greater judicial discretion regarding statutory damages is the possibility of extreme results unintended by Congress.
In addition, "workability is a fundamental concern for any legal standard or test." 141 Any statutorily granted judicial discretionary allowance would need to be workable by the courts. One of the difficulties of providing for greater judicial discretion "is that it often requires difficult factual inquiries and subjective policy judgments which are more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial, determination." 142 Also, a judge's reduction of damages still requires a trip to the courthouse by the downstream consumer, and it may be easier to settle than to hope that a sympathetic judge hears the case. Legal fees would accrue even if the defendant is successful, and a settlement may occur regardless. Thus, providing for judicial discretion regarding damages may not eliminate the threat of potential collateral damage of deterring consumers from legally downloading new music.
Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Shift the Burden of Proof
A third alternative would be for Congress to amend § 504 to shift the burden of proof regarding innocent infringement from defendant to plaintiff. Currently, the onus is on the defendant to prove innocent infringement. 143 In the case of a consumer downloading a song from a website that was authorized to sell the song from the defendant-musician, however, the burden could instead shift to the plaintiff to prove "non-
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innocent" infringement. If Congress chose to enact one or several of the other alternatives discussed in Part V.B as well, then a plaintiff's failure to meet his burden of proof could lead to either zero or negligible monetary damages. Shifting the burden of proof would mean that the plaintiff would have a higher overall hurdle to meet for downstream consumers who purchase infringing songs. 144 This may parallel the initial burden placed on copyright owners proceeding with take-down requests under the DMCA. In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., the court found that in order for a copyright owner to proceed with a take-down notice under the DMCA, there must be "'a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law' [and] the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright." 145 Similarly, in order to collect more than nominal damages, the statute could require a plaintiff suing consumers for downloading an infringing song from an online music retailer to show that the consumer's actions were not those of an "innocent infringer." The plaintiff-musician would still have a claim against the infringing musician for every downloaded song, as well as against the online music retailer, but both of these defendants have greater resources at their disposal and are more cognizant of the risks than the downstream consumer. Additionally, the online music retailer and the infringing musician are in a better position to negotiate for the possibility of an infringement lawsuit by the copyright owner regarding the alleged infringement.
146
Both allowing for more judicial discretion in awarding damages and shifting the burden of "innocent infringement" to the plaintiff, however, could lead to forum shopping and inconsistent results in different jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions may be more inclined to find in favor of consumer defendants and others less likely. Our system of justice seeks to discourage forum shopping and avoids inequitable administration of the law. 147 This burden-shifting approach may resolve the issue, but could also result in undesired consequences.
Of the options discussed above-both judicial and legislativewhich one is the recommended approach? All have pros and cons associated with them. As noted previously, leaving it to the courts to declare that consumers were not intended infringers or to sua sponte reduce damages below the statutory minimums are not prudent solutions. A court will not wish to disturb a jury's finding. Indeed, hoping for a solution in the courts could also lead to bullying by the copyright owner through the threat of a lawsuit-a consumer is more likely to settle with the copyright owner than defend the suit in court.
Therefore, sensible courses of action include adding an exemption to infringement liability under § 501 of the 1976 Act or amending § 504 to reduce or eliminate liability for monetary damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
While some musicians may pursue consumers for this form of infringement, many others may not. Some artists see any use of their music by someone other than themselves as unacceptable, 148 while others may choose to only seek remuneration from the infringing musician. Music downloading has become the dominant way to purchase songs, and with so many consumers who could be affected, inconsistent enforcement could have a profound and widespread effect that extends beyond copyright law. Inconsistent enforcement against downstream consumer infringers could weaken our overall fidelity to the law. In addition, if infringement suits are brought against defendants who believe they are lawfully downloading songs, consumers may see little difference-and less risk-in downloading a song legally versus illegally. 149 Taken to an extreme, this seemingly absurd form of infringement litigation could erode some basic tenets of our societynamely our respect for the rule of law.
In his article, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law, James Gibson posits that Americans firmly support the rule of law as crucial for an effective democracy. 150 He notes that consistency is at the heart of this concept:
Where power is arbitrary, personal, and unpredictable, the citizenry will not know how to behave; it will fear that any action could produce an unforeseen risk. Essentially, the rule of law means: (1) that people . . . will be treated equally by the institutions administering the law-the courts, the police, and the civil service; and (2) that people and institutions can predict with reasonable certainty the consequences of their actions, at least as far as the state is concerned. 151 "But the rule of law is more than a set of institutions, a constitution, or a book of statutes.
Indeed, perhaps [its] most important manifestation . . . is its representation in a nation's culture-the beliefs, expectations, values, and attitudes held by [a country's citizens]." 152 Indeed, Gibson points to Professor Martin Krygier's admonition that the rule of law holds manifest and fundamental importance based on "'a widespread assumption within society that law matters and should matter.'" 153 As a society, we abhor regimes in which arbitrary laws are created and administered at the whim of its leader with little or no constraint, such as Iraq when it was ruled by the late Saddam Hussein or the former Soviet Union under the control of the late Joseph Stalin.
Lack of faith that the rule of law will be followed-by either a country's government or its citizens-may erode confidence, discourage corporations from conducting business, and in the situation described in this Article, deter consumers from purchasing new musical compositions. If consumers no longer purchase legal downloads of new music 154 either foregoing any download or, in the alternative, downloading the song in an infringing manner-this could affect the business models of recording companies, purveyors of music scores, and retail stores. 155 If KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 consumers choose to forgo any download, then new artists would be stifled in their ability to have their music proliferated among the masses, contrary to the purpose of the 1976 Act.
156
When contemplating the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress never intended to transform everyone who buys a best-selling song into an infringer because it is later discovered that the downloaded musical composition is infringing another.
157
One should seriously question whether casting an infringement net around large masses of consumers who have made purchases in good faith is the kind of behavior society wishes to encourage. music scores on traditional publishers).
156. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) ("The primary objective of the [1976] Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.").
157. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
